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MEDICAL FUTILITY AND RELIGIOUS FREE 
EXERCISE 
 




A tragic scenario has become all too common in hospitals 
across the United States. Dying patients pray for medical 
miracles when their physicians think that continuing treatment 
would render no meaningful benefit. This situation is 
unfortunately referred to as “medical futility.”  A fraught term, 
“medical futility” covers any request for treatment that is 
considered inappropriate because it “merely preserves 
permanent unconsciousness or cannot end dependence on 
intensive medical care  . . . .”1 In these cases, physicians, who are 
less likely than their patients to rely on God as a means of coping 
with major illness, are at an impasse.2 Their patients request 
everything be done so that they can have more time for God to 
intervene, but in the physician’s professional experience, 
everything will probably do nothing.  What is the physician to do? 
The conundrum is a modern one: medical technologies 
such as breathing machines and dialysis units can support 
human bodies almost indefinitely when many of our organs fail. 
But is there any limit on this technological imperative? Every 
state and the U.S. Constitution recognize that a patient has the 
legal right to refuse unwanted treatment, even if it is life-
sustaining.3 However, there is no corresponding constitutional 
                                                 
*Professor of Law at the University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law and Adjunct 
Professor of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah. This article is based in part 
on an empirical project I conducted and published as part of the 2015 Petrie-Flom 
Conference on Law, Religion and Health Care at Harvard Law School. A related 
article explores health care providers’ views of medical futility and religion.  See 
Teneille Brown, Accommodating Miracles, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen, & Elizabeth Sepper, eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2017). This research was also made possible in part 
through generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty 
Excellence.  
1 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker, & Albert R. Jonsen, Medical Futility: 
Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALLS INTERNAL MED. 949, 949 (1990). 
2 Farr Curlin et al., Religious Characteristics of U.S. Physicians, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL 
MED. 629, 631–632 (2005).  
3 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“But for purposes of 
this case, we assume the United States Constitution would grant a competent person 
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”); see 
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right to demand specific treatments.4  This is not simply about the 
ability to pay.  Even if an individual’s private insurance would 
cover aggressive treatments, or if the individual had the financial 
means to pay out of pocket, a physician need not offer treatments 
to a patient if in her judgment they would be medically 
ineffective, or futile. Tort law recognizes this professional 
deference by defeating a negligence claim if the physician 
complied with the medical standard of care.5  
To underscore this professional deference, most states 
have passed so-called “medical futility statutes.”6 These statutes 
make it explicit that physicians have immunity from negligence 
claims if a physician refuses to offer futile treatment, so long as 
particular statutory safeguards are met.7 Physicians are generally 
quite reluctant to invoke these statutes, but they are particularly 
reluctant to do so when the patient’s request for treatment is 
based on a religious belief in miracles. There is a sense that 
religious reasons are different and should be given special 
consideration. Religious-based challenges to medical futility 
policies place individuals at odds with secular providers and the 
state, and “frequently generate particularly difficult questions 
about the proper relationship between religiously faithful citizens 
and the sovereign government.”8  Even if there is no general legal 
entitlement to medical care and physicians may be immunized 
from negligence claims, can the invocation of a state’s medical 
futility statute violate free exercise? This is the question I address 
in this article. 
                                                 
also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137 (1986) (“[A] person of 
adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own 
body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.”) (citation 
omitted). 
4 Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 712 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). For a discussion of the restrictions on the limited right to medical 
care for prison inmates under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see also Carl 
Drechsler, Annotation, Relief Under Federal Civil Rights Acts to State Prisoners 
Complaining of Denial of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279 (1976). 
5 Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirement 
for Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 51 
(2007). 
6 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse 
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007)  (“Over the past fifteen years, 
a majority of states have enacted medical futility statutes that permit a health care 
provider to refuse a patient's request for life-sustaining medical treatment.”). 
7 Id. 
8 Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical 
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2013). 
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This article has just two parts.  The first part will 
contextualize the problem by describing the history of medical 
miracles, and why there are so many appeals to them in modern 
medical practice. The second part will explain why medical 
futility statutes do not violate a patient’s religious free exercise, 
as this concept has developed under the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence and state and federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts.  
 
I. THE HISTORY AND UBIQUITY OF MEDICAL MIRACLES 
 
A.  All Five Major World Religions Promote Belief in “Miracles” 
A 2013 Harris Poll indicated that a whopping 72% of 
Americans believe in divine miracles. This is down from 
previous polls, but still quite high compared to other Western 
countries.9 An older poll conducted by Time/CNN reported that 
77% of Americans believed “that God sometimes intervenes to 
cure people who have serious illnesses.”10 “This same poll 
report[ed] that 82% of Americans” believe in the power of prayer 
to heal the sick.11 Eighty-two percent. We are hard-pressed to 
find any other question related to personal beliefs with such a 
high percentage of agreement. 
Miracle narratives are found in all five of the major world 
religions, and healing miracles are prominent among them. 
However, the symbolic value and meaning of miracles is 
different in the context of each faith. For example, what we 
would today refer to as a “miracle” has no synonym in Hebrew. 
The writers of the Jewish bible had no conception of an 
occurrence that would violate the laws of nature, given that the 
divine and ordinary worlds could not be separated.12  
                                                 
9 Larry Shannon-Missal, Americans’ Belief in God, Miracles and Heaven Declines, HARRIS 
POLL (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.theharrispoll.com/health-and-
life/Americans__Belief_in_God__Miracles_and_Heaven_Declines.html. 
10 Claudia Wallis, Faith and Healing, TIME, June 24, 1996, at 58. Peter H. Van Ness & 
David B. Larson, Religion, Senescence, and Mental Health, AM. J. OF GERIATRIC 
PSYCHIATRY 386 (2002). 
11 Id. 
12 What we would today call “miracles” are clustered around the Moses stories of 
Exodus and Numbers, and the Elijah and Elisha stories in R. Walter L. Moberly, 
Miracles in the Hebrew Bible, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MIRACLES 62 
(Graham Twelftree ed., 2011). 
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Hinduism,13 Buddhism,14 and Catholicism15 believe that 
modern miracle-workers exist among us and reinforce our faith.  
Each of these faiths discourages the display of miracles for their 
own sake, and enlightened Buddhists who publicize the miracles 
they perform are frowned upon.16 The centrality and significance 
of miracles varies depending on the religion. For example, the 
many documented miracles of Mohammed are “not at all as 
central to Muslim faith as the miracles of Jesus are to 
Christians.”17  
In some religions such as Judaism and Islam, familiar 
stories that today would be described as “miracles” are 
contextualized as having occurred thousands of years ago——
when new religions competed with magical paganism and 
needed to prove their divine power and truths.18 For millennia, 
Protestants also believed that miracles only occurred in biblical 
times.19 However, the notion of the “limited age of miracles” was 
reconsidered and largely abandoned by Protestant theologians in 
                                                 
13 Yogis perform “bodily feats which an outsider might judge to be superhuman”; 
“[t]hey can live for weeks without nourishment, endure fantastic extremes of heat 
and cold, go into suspended animation, stop breathing (or nearly so) for hours, [and] 
change their rate of heartbeat.” Even so, yogis would not likely describe this as a 
“miracle,” and instead they view these as “psychosomatic techniques that are done 
at will.” GEOFFREY ASHE, MIRACLES 131 (1st ed. 1978). The Hindu faith does not 
emphasize the distinction between the natural and the unnatural worlds, and so the 
word “miracle” possesses different connotations than it does for us today. The 
miracles of the Hindu faith are often the result of power-plays between a 
manifestation of a Hindu god, and some demon, where the Hindu god prevails and 
reveals his prowess.  All of life is in God’s hands, and so while it seems that the gods 
are playful and sometimes spiteful, miracles are happening all of the time. KENNETH 
L. WOODWARD, THE BOOK OF MIRACLES 265–66 (2000). 
14 The miracles of the Buddha, Siddhartha, take on cosmic proportions, and reveal 
his superiority over all other beings.  The Buddha was the only being who had 
complete control of his final rebirth.  He chose where, when, and in which family to 
be reborn for the last time. He also makes someone near him invisible to another and 
overpowers fiery dragons by himself bursting into flames. See Rupert Gethin, Tales of 
Miraculous Teachings: Miracles in Early Indian Buddhism, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO MIRACLES 216, 221 (Graham H. Twelftree ed., 2011). 
15 Peter Berger, The Hospital: On the Interface Between Secularity and Religion, 52 
SOCIETY 410, 412 (2015). 
16 WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 24. 
17 While the moon was split in two at Mecca when Muhammed asked for a sign from 
Allah, and he repeatedly fed huge groups of people on tiny amounts of food, these 
miracles are not central to Muhammed’s biography.  They are instead merely 
referenced in a list format. Id. at 184–85 (citing L. ZOLONDEK, BOOK XX OF AL-
GHAZALI’S IHYA’ ULUM AL-DIN 45 (1963)). 
18 ROBERT BRUCE MULLIN, MIRACLES AND THE MODERN RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION, 
191–92 (Yale Univ. Press ed., 1996). 
19 Id. 
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the early twentieth century in light of a need to explain the 
relationship between God and the modern world.20  
Whether God intervenes directly to perform modern 
miracles remains an essential question to many religious 
thinkers. What one group may refer to as mere providence or 
good luck, another might attribute to the indirect workings of 
God. This difficulty differentiating between good luck and divine 
intervention is nowhere more pronounced than in medicine. The 
relationship between the healing arts and religious miracles goes 
back to ancient times and carries through, in some 
denominations, to the present. The Greek God Asklepios 
performed miraculous medical feats, including curing facial 
injuries, kidney stones, weapon wounds, and blindness, and 
removing tumors, lice, worms, headaches, infertility, chest 
infections, and disfigured limbs.21 Incidentally, he sometimes 
used snakes in his treatments, and the rod of Askelpios, the 
snake-entwined staff, remains a leading symbol of medicine.22  
In the present day, Christians are the religious group that 
most frequently pray for, and expect, modern healing miracles.23 
This is perhaps unsurprising, as so many of Jesus Christ’s 
miracles involved healing the sick and physically disabled.24 
Jesus makes the blind see; he renders the paralyzed able to walk; 
he cures lepers and epileptics.25 Christ is even capable of healing 
from a distance, as when he removed the fever from a dying boy 
and restored him to health.26 As Christian sects have divided and 
                                                 
20 Since the early 1900s, Protestant clerics now state that the healing of the present 
day may be connected with the gifts of healing that the apostles exhibited in the 
bible. Id. 
21 HOWARD CLARK KEE, MIRACLES IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN WORLD 78–86 (Yale 
Univ. Press ed., 1983) (“[Asklepios the Healer] appears throughout these centuries 
not only as the agent of divine cures but also as the founder of the medical profession 
. . . . as a human being with therapeutic skills, as a hero, and as a god . . . attempts to 
trace the development of this figure have not produced definitive results.”).  
22 See What’s in a Symbol, UF HEALTH, http://humanism.med.ufl.edu/chapman-
projects/art-of- medicine-project- 2005-2006/whats-in-a- symbol/ (last visited Nov. 
8, 2016). 
23WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 21 (“[O]f all the world religions, Christianity is the 
one that has most stressed miracles.”). 
24 See Patrick J. Kiger, What Do the World’s Religions Say About Miracles?, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/the-story-of-god-with-
morgan-freeman/articles/what-do-the-worlds-religions-say-about- miracles/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
25 See id. 
26 WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 131. 
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subdivided, there exists great variety between groups in 
interpreting Jesus’s biblical healing miracles. Some groups read 
these miracles metaphorically, while others view them as having 
occurred exactly as described.27 Either way, the stories of Jesus’s 
healing miracles hold a central place in the Christian ethos.  
The role of healing miracles in Catholicism is particularly 
well documented. A fascinating and thorough review of the 
Vatican canonization archives demonstrates that 95% of more 
than 600 miracles performed by candidates for Catholic 
sainthood between 1600 AD and 2000 AD involved healing the 
sick or disabled.28 The connection between miraculously healing 
the blind, epileptic, those suffering from tuberculosis, unknown 
paralysis, and other ailments has close scriptural connections to 
the Catholic faiths, and in the more modern experiences of 
evangelical Christian faiths.29 Even so, this practice became 
marginalized with the rise of scientific medicine in the early 
twentieth century.30  
Healing miracles reappeared after 1945 in the Christian 
Pentecostalism movement.31 The practice of “praying for the 
sick was revived on a scale hitherto unknown.”32 As a result, 
it became commonplace for many Christians to believe that 
God is “capable of effecting miraculous healings, with 
significant numbers claiming to have been ‘healed’ of physical 
or mental ailments.”33 This branch of Christianity spread 
throughout the world, particularly in West Africa, India, 
South Africa, and the Southern United States and gave rise to 
testaments where “paralytics arise from wheelchairs, stiff knees 
become flexible, cancerous ulcers disappear, and headaches 
vanish.”34 It is likely this cultural script or story has stuck with 
                                                 
27 See Barry L. Blackburn, The Miracles of Jesus, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
MIRACLES 113, 124 (Graham H. Twelftree ed., 2011).  
28 Jacalyn Duffin, The Doctor Was Surprised; or, How to Diagnose a Miracle, 81 BULL. 
HIST. MED. 699, 706 (2007); see also WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 367. 
29 Andrew Singleton, “Your Faith Has Made You Well”: The Role of Storytelling in the 




 Id. (quoting JOHN T. NICHOL, PENTECOSTALISM 221 (1966)). 
33 Id. 
34 Jorg Stolz, “All Things Are Possible”: Towards a Sociological Explanation of Pentecostal 
Miracles and Healing, 72 SOC. RELIGION 456, 456, 458 (2011) (“When critics say that 
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many Americans and has provided modern exemplars of 
miraculous healing through prayer.  
While not meant to be exhaustive, this brief and sweeping 
introduction may provide some context for the modern requests 
for miracles in hospitals across the country. Dating back to 
ancient times, references to miracles often involved the healing 
arts as well as the ability of God to change the shape of objects, 
triumph over supernatural demons, resurrect the dead, or light 
things on fire.35 The rise of Christian miracle revival stories 
occurred simultaneously with the growth of modern medical 
technologies such as sterile surgery, chemotherapy, dialysis, or 
artificial breathing. In this post-scientific world, the idea that 
God could save you from floods or burning houses has 
somewhat receded from our popular landscape.36 But medicine 
and healing remain a central part of our culture.37 The role of 
miracle-making in this domain has ballooned where the stories 
of God proving his existence through threatening species 
extinction, contests between gods, or transmutation have 
diminished. The search for God in the modern world has settled 
on finding his presence in the hospital or clinic.  
 
B.  Religious Patients, Secular Physicians  
The fact that people turn to religion in times of health 
crisis does not necessarily render the appeals to miracles suspect. 
If there were just one time in a person’s life when she will pray 
for a miracle, it is likely to be at the bedside of a dying loved one. 
Medical crises often lead to intensification of religiosity and 
powerful religious conversions.38 This phenomenon does not just 
                                                 
[Pentecostal] healers produce ‘only a placebo effect,’ these anthropologists answer 
that, precisely, the placebo effect shows that humans are a socio-psycho-physical 
entity in which the symbolic may have an effect on the physical[.]”) (citations 
omitted). 
35 WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 63–64, 69–70, 130–31. 
36 See e.g. Michael Lipka, Why American’s ‘Nones’ Left Religion Behind, PEW RES. 
CENTER, Aug. 24, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/24/why-
americas-nones-left-religion-behind/#. 
37 For a representative collection of movies, novels, and other popular culture items 
that feature medicine, spirituality, and healing, see Jenn Lindsay, Larry A. Whitney 
& Stephanie N. Riley, Spirituality, Medicine, & Health – Popular Culture, BOSTON 
UNIVERSITY PERSONAL WEBSITES 
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/smh/content_popculture.htm. 
38 Kenneth Ferraro and Jessica Kelley-Moore, Religious Consolation Among Men and 
Women: Do Health Problems Spur Seeking? 39 J. OF SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 220, 226–
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hold for religious nations, where the religious beliefs parallel the 
level of religious practice. The more secular a nation is in its 
public sphere and religious practice, the more likely its citizens are 
to turn to hospitals as religious forums when disease strikes.39  As 
one researcher put it, in the low-religiosity nation of Denmark, 
the “[p]rayer houses . . . are no longer the churches but the 
hospitals.”40  
There is an intense sociological connection between our 
culture and the way we die. In addition to the rich history of 
religiously moderated medical miracles, patients may separately 
hope for a miracle because of significant changes in the way 
Americans experience death. In the early part of the last century, 
we used to die at younger ages, from infections, childbirth, and 
wounds.41 We now have nearly doubled our life expectancy from 
47 years in 1900 to 78 in 2008.42 We are less likely to die from 
acute infections, and are more likely to die of chronic conditions 
like heart failure, cancer, and diabetes.43 Many now believe that 
“sickness, pain, and premature death were no longer viewed as 
immovable points on the human landscape, but as problems that 
could be removed through human intelligence and ingenuity.”44  
This raises another important change in the sociology of 
the Western Christian world: the “mundanization” of ordinary 
life.45 While earlier Christian cultures in the United States and 
elsewhere focused on the after-life, there is much greater focus 
now on this life.46 Put differently, while good Christians used to 
                                                 
227 (2000). 
39 Niels Christian Hvidt, Patient Belief in Miraculous Healing: Positive or Negative Coping 
Resource?, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MIRACLES 309, 311 (Graham H. 
Twelftree ed., 2011) (footnote omitted). 
40 Id. 
41 Tenielle R. Brown, Denying Death, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 980 (2015) [hereinafter 
Brown I]. 
42 Id. at 981. 
43 Id. There is some data to suggest that our life expectancies continued to rise in the 
latter part of the 20th century, and was correlated with passage of the Medicare Act.  
However, other countries saw an increase in their life expectancies around the same 
time and so it is not clear whether the correlation is in fact causal.  See Muriel 
Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 27, 33 
(2012); Expectation of Life at Birth, 1970 to 2008, and Projections, 2010 to 2020, Table 104, 
STAT. ABSTRACT U.S. 77 (2012), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0104.pdf. 
44 MULLIN, supra note 18, at 85. 
45  Id. at 86. 
46 Id. 
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work toward a good death, now they work toward a good life. 
Death became a scientific phenomenon to be solved by 
mortals.47 This presented a dramatic change in how Americans 
died. We used to die at home, surrounded by loved ones.48 We 
struggled to practice a good or “holy” death, where we 
gracefully accepted the will of God, welcomed the chance to 
atone our sins, and did not treat illness as a war to be won.49 
Conversely, the opposite is now true. The degree of one’s 
religious coping is now positively correlated with receiving 
more intensive and life-prolonging care.50 
Despite the fact that most Americans would still prefer 
to die at home, most of us no longer do; we are much more 
likely to die in hospitals, acute care facilities, or intensive care 
units.51 Hospitals used to be staffed by Catholic nuns when they 
first began as religious charities that served the poor.52 
However, hospitals are now are much more likely to serve all 
socioeconomic groups and have a secular and for-profit 
corporate structure.53 The secular orientation of most of these 
facilities means that health care providers (“providers,” going 
forward) generally do not see their role as a spiritual one.54 
Even if they are religious in their private lives, they do not see 
this as bearing on their clinical work.55 This means that while 
                                                 
47 DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR 6–7 (2008). 
48 Id. 
49  Id. at 6–10 (“The concept of the Good Death was central to mid-nineteenth-
century America, as it had long been at the core of Christian practice.  Dying was an 
art, and the tradition of ars moriendi had provided rules of conduct for the moribund 
and their attendants since at least the fifteenth century: how to give up one’s soul 
‘gladlye and wilfully’; how to meet the devil’s temptations of unbelief, despair, 
impatience, and worldly attachment…”).  
50 Hanneke W. M. van Laarhoven, Johannes Schilderman & Judith Prins, Religious 
Coping and Life-Prolonging Care, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 257, 257 (2009). 
51 Id. 
52 Barbra Mann Wall, The Pin-Striped Habit: Balancing Charity and Business in Catholic 
Hospitals, 1865–1915, 51 NURSING RES. 50, 50 (2002) (“Between 1865 and 1915, 
Catholic sister-nurses built impressive hospital networks throughout the United 
States. These hospitals were, first, manifestations of religious and charitable ideals.”).  
53 Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, 
Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Jason M. 
Kellhofer, The Misperception and Misapplication of the First Amendment in the American 
Pluralistic System: Mergers Between Catholic and Non-Catholic Healthcare Systems, 16 J.L. 
& HEALTH 103 (2002). 
54 Curlin et al., supra note 3, at 632. 
55 Id. 
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hospitals are the location of death for most of us, they are 
usually ill-equipped to deal with the religious aspects of death.   
While very recent trends show that fewer Americans are 
dying in hospitals or nursing homes, about 70% still do,56 and 
many die just days after receiving aggressive care.57 This 
relatively new shift from dying at home to dying in a facility may 
have disrupted cultural notions about the role of health care 
providers in the end of life. Of course, nurses and doctors treat 
infection, prematurity, pain, heart disease and cancer, but when 
these treatments are offered so near one’s death, how could the 
clinical work be so neatly divided from the spiritual?   
Medicine has really struggled with this new normal. 
Indeed, providers and staff are less religious than the patients 
they treat on average, and are distressed when patients are 
perceived to shut down the end-of-life conversation by playing 
the “trump card” of “waiting for a miracle.”58  Many studies 
report that providers feel untrained and uncomfortable 
discussing the spiritual aspects of end of life care.59 It is no 
wonder that the majority of Americans report that providers 
never spoke to them about what they want their death to be like, 
                                                 
56 See CDC, DEATH STATISTICS (Apr. 9, 2008), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/Mortfinal2005_worktable_309.pdf. 
57 Murray Enkin et al., Death Can Be Our Friend: Embracing the Inevitable Would Reduce 
Both Unnecessary Suffering And Costs, 343 BRIT. MED. J. 1277, 1277 (2011) (“Too many 
people are dying undignified graceless deaths in hospital wards or intensive care 
units, with doctors battling against death way past the point that is humane.”); see 
Derek C. Angus et al., Use of Intensive Care at the End of Life in the United States: An 
Epidemiologic Study, 32 CRITICAL CARE MED. 638–643 (2004) (nearly forty percent of 
all deaths nationwide occur in the acute care setting and approximately twenty 
percent involve the use of intensive care services); Alvin C. Kwok et al., The Intensity 
and Variation of Surgical Care at the End of Life: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 378 THE 
LANCET 1408, 1408 (2011) (“A fifth of elderly Americans die in intensive-care 
services and of these patients, about half undergo mechanical ventilation and a 
quarter undergo cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the days before death. 
Furthermore, the intensity of end-of-life care varies substantially on the basis of the 
facility where patients receive care.”).  
58 Paul R. Helft, Waiting for a Miracle, CANCER NETWORK: ONCOLOGY J. (2014), 
http://www.cancernetwork.com/oncology-journal/waiting-
miracle#sthash.YPtTbtXB.dpuf (“[A]lthough it is clear from national survey data 
that US adults are extraordinarily likely to believe that such supernatural events as 
divine healing can occur, healthcare professionals are consistently less likely to 
believe in them. However, because of the special respect we give to faith-based 
claims, ‘waiting for a miracle’ can become a sort of ‘trump card’ that is capable of 
shutting down further attempts to limit treatments.”). 
59 Bernard Lo et al., Discussing Religious and Spiritual Issues at the End of Life: A Practical 
Guide for Physicians, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 749, 749 (2002). 
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or the spiritual aspects of these medical decisions.60 Given this 
portrait, how could this imperfect mixing of the roles of the 
religious and the medical not be perplexing to most Americans?  
How could it not lead to moral confusion about the role of prayer 
and religious belief at the end of life? Physicians shepherd their 
patients through the war on death, but often do little to prepare 
them for when the battle is ultimately lost.   
Another important factor in this equation is the 
development of artificial life support. More Americans are dying 
in medical facilities precisely because they are suffering from 
organ failure that can be supported by relatively new medical 
devices.61 A disorder that would have led to an imminent death 
a hundred years ago can now be treated with machines, and 
reimbursed through insurance.  Our kidneys can be dialyzed, our 
stomachs can be fed through tubes, our lungs can be ventilated, 
our bladders can be evacuated, our hearts can be pumped, and 
our diaphragms can be paced. The advent of these life-sustaining 
devices is miraculous in one sense of the word, as life can be 
artificially supported, sometimes indefinitely. However, these 
advances also challenge our religious beliefs about when to give 
up hope and acknowledge it is the end. Artificial life support 
certainly challenges our very definitions of death. Is someone 
with minimal brain activity, but who is breathing, eating, and 
performing other life functions that are only possible because of 
artificial support from machines, still alive?  In this metaphysical 
sense, medicine has been a victim of its own success.  
The cultural, religious, institutional and technological 
developments of the last century have led us to rely on doctors 
as our partners in fighting death. With more and more 
medicines, procedures, and data, physicians have become 
modern day miracle workers in combatting death and disease. 
They have been our partners in this fight. In one study, eighty 
percent of Southern respondents viewed physicians as “God’s 
mechanics.”62 But these same doctors are not theologians, they 
                                                 
60 Brown I, supra note 42, at 987–988. 
62 Suzanne Prevost & J. Brandon Wallace, Dying in Institutions, in DECISION MAKING 
NEAR THE END OF LIFE: ISSUES, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 189–90 
(James Werth and Dean Blevins eds., 2008).  
62 Forty percent believed “God's will is the most important factor in recovery,” and 
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are healers, and increasingly driven by data. When we ask these 
same people to take seriously the hope for religious prayer, some 
are sympathetic, but many see this final pursuit as outside the 
realm of their expertise.63 
The progress of modern medicine has led us to mutually 
engage in recovery narratives with our doctors. We are fighting 
cancer, heart disease, together. We will try subsequent 
treatments, and we will prevail. But of course this is the 
optimistic narrative physicians tell, to keep patients hopeful and 
to avoid uncomfortable conversations about near death. 
Patients and their surrogates may be particularly flummoxed 
when providers refer to any additional treatment as “futile,” 
and recommend withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Why 
are these doctors, who have been helping us fight death for so 
long, suddenly giving up? Do they not believe in miracles? Did 
they lose their faith? Why will they not give this loved one just 
a little more time?   
It is not always religious differences that motivate 
conflicts over medical futility. In some cases, the provider’s 
financial motives, as a steward of hospital or insurance 
resources, might be questioned.64 The surrogate might also 
distrust the provider on a more personal level, and wonder 
whether their loved one is being hustled toward death because 
of his lack of education and money, or because of his race or 
ethnicity.65 Even when the conflict is not borne of distrust, the 
surrogates might still be in denial of their loved one’s prognosis, 
and unable to come to grips with the fact that she will never 
return to the way she was. The provider, as the bearer of this 
                                                 
the study found that spiritual faith in healing was stronger among women than men. 
Christopher J. Mansfield et al., The Doctor as God’s Mechanic? Beliefs in the Southeastern 
United States, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 399–409 (2002).  
63 This sentiment is based on my experience on hospital ethics committees and the 
response to requests for religious miracles.   
64 Rationing and futility are two different things. “Rationing refers to the allocation 
of beneficial treatments among patients; [whereas] futility refers to whether a 
treatment will benefit an individual patient.” Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 985, 990 (2009) (quoting Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical 
Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 985, 988 
(1996)). 
65 “Futility cases most commonly involve patients and families from the more 
marginalized and disadvantaged segments of our society. These are families who 
have lived on the outskirts of our healthcare system, and who have frequently been 
denied or perceive that they have been denied, care that is beneficial.” Id. at 988. 
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dark and unhopeful news, may be punished for being the 
messenger. While each of these is important and can work in 
tandem with other reasons, I am not addressing any of them 
specifically in this article. Here I will focus on the situation 
where the patient, surrogate or family believe in God’s divine 
ability to work miracles, and are concerned that this belief is 
not mirrored or supported by the hospital or staff.   
For the surrogate who wants to conserve life, there are 
likely asymmetrical costs.  If we pray for a miracle, it just might 
happen, but if we withdraw or discontinue life-sustaining 
treatments, our loved one will almost certainly die.  Many things 
may fuel this belief in miracles: religious tradition, personal 
spirituality, or even a pop culture recollection of a patient who 
suddenly “woke up” after years of being on a ventilator.66  They 
hope that their loved one will similarly beat the odds, and they 
are disappointed that the clinicians hold out no such hope. They 
are not thinking of balancing data on probable outcomes, costs, 
and availability of hospital beds. They are understandably just 
thinking of their loved one.  
When patients or families contest the withdrawal of 
treatment, it puts providers in a very uncomfortable position. In 
addition to being empiricists rather than theologians, providers 
may have chosen their profession because they saw something 
special in the doctor-patient relationship. The latter part of the 
twentieth century saw a transition in this relationship from a 
model of “doctor knows best” toward a model that prioritizes the 
autonomy and wishes of the patient.67 This valuable shift has 
inadvertently engendered a more commercial model of health 
care, where the patient views herself as a customer.68 It is fair to 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., NICHOLAS SPARKS, THE CHOICE (Grand Central Publishing 2007) (where 
a woman wakes up after being in a coma for a significant period of time); WHILE 
YOU WERE SLEEPING (Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Inc. 1995). 
67 Robert Veatch, Doctor Does Not Know Best: Why in the New Century Physicians Must 
Stop Trying to Benefit Patients, 25 J. OF MED. AND PHILOSOPHY 701, 702 (2000). 
68 Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients As Medical Consumers, 
96 GEO. L.J. 583, 586 (2008); Robert Pearl, Are You A Patient Or A Healthcare 
Consumer?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2015/10/15/are-you-a-patient-or-a-
health-care-consumer-why-it-matters/#68088ba65c3a (“Advocates who insist on 
calling us ‘consumers’ believe that high-tech can solve nearly all of healthcare’s 
challenges. They argue that in the digital age, control has shifted to the individual 
and must continue to do so.”). 
 
56 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 15 
say that most providers do not like this trend.69 They resist 
medicine becoming just another commercial good, “like 
breakfast cereal and toothpaste.”70 And they do not want to be 
“indentured servants” or “grocers,” required to provide 
whatever treatment their patients and surrogates want.71 This 
offers yet another reason why the conflict between provider and 
family can become so intractable when the family demands 
certain life-sustaining care that the provider believes are 
inappropriate. 
In addition to resisting the commercial model of health 
care, nurses and physicians also resist feeling complicit in 
“torturing” a patient with ventilators, pokes, and tracheotomies.  
If they chose their profession in order to heal, as most nurses and 
physicians do, then this can be emotionally draining if their 
present work feels diametrically opposed to this goal. This 
emotional toll may be especially pronounced when the patient is 
unlikely to receive any clinical benefit, but the treatments cause 
visible pain or distress.72 In these cases, appeals to medical futility 
may address the provider’s spiritual as well as professional needs.  
While the family is praying for a miracle, the provider might be 
hoping or praying for the patient’s physical pain to end, along 
with their role in perpetuating it.   
 
C.  Tragic (Sometimes Legal) Conflicts Between Patients and Providers 
Some reading this will remember the case of Baby Rena, 
from the early 1990s. Baby Rena was HIV+ and had respiratory 
distress and cardiac failure.73 She had excessive cerebral spinal 
fluid in her brain, kidney dysfunction, needed a ventilator to 
                                                 
69 Pope, supra note 6, at 15. 
70 George Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care – The Case of 
Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1545 (1994); see also Eric Gampel, Does 
Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments?, 20 BIOETHICS 92, 97 (2006); 
Pope, supra note 6, at 15. 
71 See Pope, supra note 6, at 14–15.  
72 See, e.g., Murray M. Pollack, Surrogate Decision Makers and Respect: Commentary on 
“The Many Faces of Autonomy,” 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 303, 303–304 (1992); Benjamin 
Weiser, A Question of Letting Go; Child’s Trauma Drives Doctors to Reexamine Ethical Role 
Series: The Case of Baby Rena Series Number: 1/2, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, at A1 
[hereinafter Weiser Part I]; Benjamin Weiser, While Child Suffered, Beliefs Clashed 
Series: The Case of Baby Rena: Who Decides When Care Is Futile? Series Number: 2/2, 
WASH. POST, July 15, 1991, at A1 [hereinafter Weiser Part II].  
73 Weiser Part I, supra note 72, at A1. 
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breathe, and had to be constantly sedated due to her expressions 
of pain.74 A Christian couple who intended to foster Baby Rena 
remained hopeful in the face of her failing health, and were 
adamant that her care “be motivated by a spiritual sense of 
obedience to God.”75 The treating doctor contended that the 
prognosis was grim and the ventilator be removed.76 Despite 
initial successes breathing on her own, Baby Rena ultimately 
died on a ventilator after receiving cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation.77 The intended foster mother was “stunned,” as her 
faith held that health was there for anyone who would just claim 
it through prayer.78    
Since the popularized case of Baby Rena, the appeals for 
miraculous medical interventions have not subsided. The family 
of Bobbi Kristina Brown, daughter of Bobbi Brown and Whitney 
Houston, “asked friends and fans to pray for a miracle” in early 
2015 after she nearly drowned in a bathtub and was rendered 
unconscious.79 In the popular press, the 2013 case of Jahi 
McMath presents another tragic standoff between surrogates and 
hospital staff.80 Jahi was an Oakland teenager who went into 
cardiac arrest after a routine tonsillectomy to alleviate sleep 
apnea.81 After being placed on a ventilator, the hospital staff 
declared the patient brain dead and suggested that the artificial 
support be withdrawn.82 Jahi’s mother insisted that as long as 
Jahi was on a ventilator and her heart was beating, God could 
work a miracle.83 Unlike the Baby Rena case, this conflict 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 David M. Smolin, Praying for Baby Rena: Religious Liberty, Medical Futility, and 
Miracles, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 960, 964–65 (1995) (quoting Weiser Part I, supra 
note 40, at A1).   
76 Weiser Part II, supra note 72, at A1. 
77 Smolin, supra note 75, at 966. 
78 Id. 
79 Kent Sepkowitz, For Bobbi Kristina Brown, Science and the Miraculous Don’t Have to Be 
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actually went before a judge.84 The judge ruled that the ventilator 
could be withdrawn if Jahi’s family could not find an alternative 
facility that would provide her care.85 Jahi’s family received 
permission to remove Jahi from Oakland Children’s Hospital, 
and as of December of 2015, Jahi’s family was still caring for her 
in a “home environment” in New Jersey.86 Jahi has remained on 
a ventilator for the last two years with no reported signs of 
improvement.87  
These cases represent very private moments that became 
heartbreaking public spectacles. But much more often, these end-
of-life decisions are made by families and providers in the 
shadow of the media or courtrooms. The cases are not always so 
clear-cut, where the medical consensus is that the patient is brain-
dead and care is absolutely futile. Sometimes, the medical team 
disagrees about whether the patient would survive withdrawal of 
mechanical ventilation, and whether she might eventually regain 
function that would be acceptable to her. While Baby Rena and 
Jahi’s cases challenged futility standards on moral and religious 
grounds, the word futility may be challenged as well on scientific 
and empirical grounds. The term itself is a vexing one, but rather 
than stumble on its imprecision, I will employ it here to mean 
that additional care is contrary to acceptable standards of care as 
there is likely no meaningful benefit to the patient. This is an 
imperfect and fuzzy standard, but in many cases a workable one.   
To address the very problem of families requesting that 
“everything be done,”88 when the provider thinks that this care is 
medically inappropriate, the majority of states have passed 
medical futility statutes.89 The typical medical futility statute 
prescribes either specific procedures or standards of conduct, and 
essentially provide immunity from civil or criminal liability for 
                                                 
84 Id. 
86 Sergio Quintata, Family In Talks with Facilities to Move Jahi McMath, ABC NEWS 
(Dec. 19, 2013), http://abc7news.com/archive/9374667/. 
86 Family Continues Legal Battle to Have Brain-Dead Girl Declared Alive, supra note 80. 
87 Id. 
88 See SCHNEIDERMAN ET AL., WRONG MEDICINE: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE 
TREATMENT 40 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press ed., 1995) (describing implications of 
requests from patients and families seeking extreme treatments and calling for 
responsive legislative reform). 
89 See generally Pope, supra note 6.  
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providers who follow the statute when withdrawing futile care.90 
Some statutes do not specifically mention the term “futility,” and 
instead just indicate that if a provider chooses for reasons of 
“conscience” not to provide life-sustaining care, she can do so, 
but must first satisfy certain requirements.91  
The futility standard is fuzzy because it assumes that there 
can be general agreement about prognosis. It is also fuzzy 
because religions provide different guidance on principles such 
as suffering, impermanence, the role of consciousness, and even 
the definition of death, which inevitably confuses any clinical 
standard of futility.92 Unfortunately, providers can never be 
absolutely certain that care is medically ineffective or futile, as 
patients rarely present in textbook ways. This uncertainty can 
lead to ambiguity in end-of-life care decision-making. An 
ideological tug-of-war may take hold between life-
conservationists and resource-conservationists, or in other 
words, between the sympathetic providers and religious family 
members on one end, and providers who think resources are 
being wasted, or that the team is complicit in torture, on the 
other. While appeals to miracles are frequent, particularly on 
television, their occurrence is not.93  Even if prognosticating is 
imperfect, there is usually agreement between physicians as to 
whether the care is futile. But even when the medical team and 
ethics committee are in agreement that the care is futile, the 
question looms large: how much time, if any, do we give the 
patient (and her family) to allow their God to intervene and 
perform a miracle?   
Skeptical providers ask whether God needs a ventilator 
to perform his miracles, and why he might perform miracles for 
                                                 
90 Id. at 58. 
91 UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-115 (West 2016). 
92 Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheidje, The Determination of Quality of Life and 
Medical Futility in Disorders of Consciousness: Reinterpreting the Moral Code of Islam, 15 
AM. J. BIOETHICS 14, 14 (2015) (discussing the effects of Islamic bioethics and 
principles of Westernization on determinations about medical futility); Tuck Wai 
Chan & Desley Hegney, Buddhism and Medical Futility, J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 434, 
434 (2012) (explaining Buddhist ethical and religious implications of medical 
futility). 
93 Susan Diem et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on Television: Miracles and 
Misinformation, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1578, 1580 (1996) (“The portrayal of miracles 
[on television] as relatively common events can undermine trust in doctors and 
data.”). 
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some devoted patients but not others.94 Believers in miracles 
focus instead on whether it is right to limit God’s potential to 
intervene by withdrawing life support prematurely, especially 
when the body is still warm and the heart is beating.95 Either 
way, the two groups are talking past each other, as they employ 
different meanings of the words “miracle” and “futility” and 
certainly put different emphases on the cost of getting the 
decision wrong.   
This paper will spend a good deal of time engaging with 
the constitutional and statutory requirements in this situation. Is 
there a legal requirement to provide ventilator support 
indefinitely while a family waits for a religious miracle? Even if 
the physician is protected from a complaint of medical 
malpractice, can the provider unilaterally withdraw support 
without violating religious free exercise?96   
 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR WITHDRAWING CARE WHEN 
FAMILIES PRAY FOR A MIRACLE 
 
Physicians overestimate the risk of being sued and this 
guides their day-to-day practice.97 Even if the actual risk is low, 
the menacing specter of a lawsuit is very real, with its reputation-
crushing and time-sucking gravity. Many providers report that 
the fear of liability is a chief reason they would give special 
consideration to a religious request for futile care.98 Avoiding a 
lawsuit becomes paramount, even if professional ethics and 
justice warrant the cessation of aggressive treatments. Whether 
                                                 
94 See generally Teneille Brown, Accommodating Miracles (Jan. 23, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review) 
[hereinafter Brown II].  
95 Id. 
96 The withdrawal is almost never truly unilateral, as the clinical team consults 
repeatedly with family, social workers, and others before aggressively advocating for 
removal of futile treatments. Even so, the term reflects that the provider may 
terminate treatments when the patient does not consent.  See Cheryl J. Misak, 
Douglas B. White & Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility: A New Look at an Old Problem, 
146 CHEST 1667, 1668 (2014) (reframing the futility discussion from the typical lens 
of a unilateral withdrawal, and instead suggesting that “[m]edical decisions are never 
made unilaterally . . . [but] are made in the context of an implicit and evolving social 
contract among patients, physicians, and societies at large.”). 
97 Barbara Phillips-Bute, Transparency and Disclosure of Medical Errors: It's the Right 
Thing to Do, So Why the Reluctance?, 35 CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 336 (2013); Emily 
Carrier et al, Physicians’ Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits Are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 
29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585, 1585 (2010). 
98 Brown II, supra note 95, at 5.   
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defensive medicine is practiced out of fear of an actual lawsuit or 
just a visit from their General Counsel’s office with an 
institutional reprimand, most providers want nothing to do with 
lawyers or their unwelcome questions.   
And it is not as if the physicians’ fears of litigation are 
baseless. There are several ways that patients or their family 
members might legally challenge a provider’s unilateral decision 
to withdraw futile life-sustaining measures. The most obvious 
suit would allege that the providers’ withdrawal of the ventilator 
or refusal to perform cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (or any 
other treatment) violates the professional standard of care. This 
could give rise to a civil tort suit for negligence against the 
provider (i.e., medical malpractice). Although most conflicts are 
resolved by giving patients a little, though not an indefinite, 
amount of time, some families persist in their denial about their 
loved one’s likely recovery and insist on futile care.99  
The medical futility statutes described above were 
enacted to prevent this sort of scenario and offer peace of mind 
to physicians invoking futility.  However, if the statute predicates 
the legal safe harbor on practicing according to the standard of 
care and in good faith, then this standard resembles an ordinary 
negligence case.100 Put another way, the patient’s family would 
argue that the medical futility statute does not shield the provider 
from tort liability because the withdrawal of care was not 
supported by good clinical judgment, or was not done in good 
faith, according to the existing professional standard. As 
Thaddeus Pope has argued, uncertainty over how juries would 
define the professional standard of care renders hollow the 
protection that medical futility statutes attempt to provide.101 
However, the particular statutory immunity in cases of medical 
futility does send a strong signal to physicians that if the standard 
of care is not to provide treatment, they should be protected from 
a negligence claim.  
Notably, malpractice tort suits are different from suits for 
temporary injunctions against the hospital. An immediate 
motion for an injunction does not argue that a tort has occurred, 
                                                 
99 Id. at 9-10. 
100 See Pope, supra note 6, at 64. 
101 See id. at 73–74. 
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but instead argues that a right will be imminently violated or 
something inequitable will result if the hospital is not stopped 
from withdrawing care right now. A tort suit, on the other hand, 
would be decided when it is too late to reverse the withdrawal. 
The plaintiff would just be compensated with money if she 
prevails on her own, or on her loved one’s behalf. 
The next type of liability could come by way of the 
criminal law. While providers may fear criminal liability, this is 
exceedingly unlikely.102 There is no state that criminally prohibits 
a provider from withdrawing care that is deemed medically 
ineffective or futile. It does not meet the criminal definition of a 
battery. It is not murder. It is not criminal neglect. As long as the 
providers are honest with the family about why they are 
withdrawing the care, there is no fraud. These types of lawsuits 
also would arise too late to enjoin the withdrawal of the care. 
While the fear of tort or criminal liability poses risks to providers, 
and will impact their decisions to unilaterally withdraw care, I 
will not be addressing these types of suits here.  
A second type of claim would involve the surrogates 
suing for constitutional due process violations. Here, the family 
could assert that the (a) public hospital’s policy of unilaterally 
withdrawing treatment, or (b) the medical futility statute itself 
violates their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.103 This might have some success if the statute does 
not allow for fair and advanced notice to the patient and a 
judicial hearing.104 The most process-oriented medical futility 
statute that was passed by Texas, the Texas Advance Directive 
Act (TADA), offers immunity from a civil or criminal lawsuit if 
the facility treating the patient follows specific notification, 
consultation, and documentation requirements.105 The 
Children’s Hospital of Boston has adopted an institutional policy 
that resembles the TADA.106 
                                                 
102 Id. at 49 (“Unilateral decisions to stop LSMT have thus led to homicide charges 
and at least one conviction. Admittedly, health care providers are rarely convicted.”).  
103 See Pope, supra note 6, at 76. 
104 Id. 
105 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2016). 
106 Robert Truog, Counterpoint: The Texas Advance Directives Act is Ethically Flawed: 
Medical Futility Disputes Must Be Resolved by a Fair Process, 136 CHEST 968, 968 (2009). 
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Specifically, under TADA, the provider must give the 
surrogate forty-eight hours’ notice before holding a meeting of 
the hospital’s ethics committee.107  The ethics committee then 
reviews the provider’s determination that the care is futile.108  If 
the committee finds that the disputed treatment is medically 
inappropriate, the surrogate is given the committee’s written 
decision, which is final and not appealable in any court.109 The 
patient or surrogate can request an extension from withdrawal 
from a district or county court, which will be granted “only if the 
court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a 
reasonable expectation that a physician or health care facility 
that will honor the patient's directive will be found if the time 
extension is granted.”110 Conversely, under the Boston 
Children’s policy, the hospital must “inform [the surrogate] of 
their legal right to seek a court order to block the hospital from 
taking this action.”111  
Under TADA, the provider is required to continue 
providing the disputed care for 10 days,112 and during this time 
the provider must make reasonable efforts to transfer the patient 
to another provider that will comply with the surrogate’s 
requests.113  If the transfer cannot be made, then the provider may 
unilaterally withdraw treatment, even life-sustaining treatment, 
on the eleventh day.114  The TADA therefore gives a great deal 
of authority to the hospital ethics committee. This absolute 
deference is procedurally suspect given that the majority of 
members are likely employed by one of the parties to the conflict 
(the hospital) and are on a first-name basis with the providers.115 
                                                 
107 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(b)(2) (West 2016). 
108 § 166.046(a). 
109 § 166.046(b)(4)(B). 
110 § 166.046(g). 
111 Truog, supra note 106, at 968 (emphasis added). 
112 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(e) (West 2016). 
113 § 166.046(d). 
114 § 166.046(e). 
115 “[Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs)] are overwhelmingly intramural bodies; 
that is, they are comprised of professionals employed directly or indirectly by the 
very same institution whose decision the HEC adjudicates. Consequently, many 
HECs make decisions that suffer from risks of corruption, bias, carelessness, and 
arbitrariness.” Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: 
The Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 
258 (2009). 
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The TADA, and laws like it, may very well be unconstitutional 
as a deprivation of a liberty interest without due process, as the 
required hearing may be inadequate and the decision-maker is 
not impartial.116 
A substantive due process claim could be brought against 
any state actor who relied on a state law to deprive a patient of a 
fundamental liberty interest.117 Compared to the procedural due 
process claim, the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due 
process claim is less likely to be successful. Following Washington 
v. Glucksberg,118 whichever “careful description” of the liberty 
interest one employs—whether it be to require a provider to 
continue care while the family prays for a religious miracle or to 
give families time to wait for a miracle in medical treatments—
this liberty interest would not be found to be “deeply rooted in 
the history and tradition” of our nation.119 Because the ability to 
sustain life through the use of technologically advanced 
equipment did not exist in our country’s early history, there is no 
case law support for the idea that demanding its use while a 
family prays for a miracle would be a fundamental liberty 
interest.  Even if it were considered a fundamental liberty 
                                                 
116 See Nora O'Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility 
Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 527, 585–89 (2008). 
117 “If one were forced to find a common thread running through the cases in the 
privacy strand of modern substantive due process jurisprudence, it would likely be 
governmental non-interference in intimate, personal decisions, especially those 
regarding sexuality (e.g., Griswold and Baird), reproduction (e.g., Roe v. Wade) and 
marriage (e.g., Loving v. Virginia). Nevertheless, despite what for a while seemed like 
a trend of expanding the ambit of the right to privacy, and perhaps because of the 
controversy that some of these decisions engendered, especially with regard to 
abortion, the Supreme Court in recent years has been extremely reluctant to expand 
the scope of the privacy strand of substantive due process beyond those limits just 
discussed.” See Jerry H. Elmer, Physician-Assisted Suicide Controversy at the Intersection 
of Law and Medicine, 46 R.I. BAR J. 13, 24 (1998). 
118 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The Supreme Court has made it very difficult to advance 
new “liberty interests.” Id. at 720–21 (noting the Court’s reluctance to expand the 
notion of substantive due process). The liberty interest must be carefully described, 
and its protection must be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’ and 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if they were sacrificed.’” Id. at 721 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); then quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). A right to demand that providers violate 
their professional standards and provide futile care so that the family can pray for a 
miracle would fail this test. 
119 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (“[S]o rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”); see also Palko, 302 
U.S. at 325–26 (“[I]mplicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”). 
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interest, it could be infringed by the state with compelling 
interests that are narrowly tailored.120 This strict scrutiny is 
similar to that found under the state and federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts, and I will analyze this test 
thoroughly in section [x]. 
Despite the interesting questions these tort, criminal, and 
Fourteenth Amendment analyses pose, I have a fourth type of 
claim in my crosshairs.  As I mentioned in the introduction, there 
is something about the religious request for futile care that makes 
providers more fastidious. They are particularly concerned about 
treading lightly on patients’ religious freedoms, perhaps even 
more concerned than they are about deviating from the medical 
standard of care.121 I am therefore exploring in this article 
whether the provider or hospital is violating the patient’s free 
exercise rights under the First Amendment, or their rights under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of their state. I will 
evaluate why patients or their family members might make such 
a religious freedom claim, and its likelihood of success. I will 
analyze relevant case law developments related to religious 
exemptions for free exercise to determine whether there might be 
a violation of the patient’s religious free exercise rights when 
providers unilaterally withdraw treatment. This liability would 
not attach to individual providers, and would be directed at the 
constitutionality of state laws and state institutional policies. I 
will also ask whether the federal or state Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts (RFRAs) might provide an avenue for 
successful legal action.   
 
A.  Unilateral Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Care Would Not Violate 
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause 
 
                                                 
120 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 
(1992). 
121 Curlin et al., supra note 2, at 129 (“[P]rofessional attention to patients’ religious 
and spiritual concerns is one part of a broader movement toward a more patient-
centered, culturally competent, narrative, and holistic medicine. This movement 
emphasizes the notion that patients interact with the health care system from a 
specific language, culture, community, and tradition, all of which shape patients’ 
decisions and experiences related to illness.”). 
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The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”122 The first part 
of this is called the “Establishment Clause,” and prohibits state 
endorsement of religion.123 The second focuses on being free 
from government restraint to express religious beliefs and 
practices.124 Historically, free exercise of religion was the right to 
act publicly on the choices of religious conscience.125 James 
Madison wrote that religious practices must be protected from 
government interference because they are inseparable from 
religious beliefs, as religion consists of both “the duties that we 
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging them.”126 
However, as we will see, there is a “wide range of alternative 
content for the first amendment's free exercise clause” and 
history, case law, and language have “left the clause open for 
widely disparate interpretation.”127  
Because many private actions could be swept up under 
the heading of religious exercise, its protection has never been 
unrestricted.  While nearly every early state constitution 
guaranteed religious free exercise rights to some degree, they 
often specified that such exercise “not violate the public peace or 
the private rights of others.”128 The early states usually narrowed 
their guarantee to “the free exercise of religious worship,” which 
meant that the protection of indirect forms of religious 
expression would need to be protected by other means, if at all.129 
In the United States, despite our history of being founded on 
religious freedom, states never went so far as to permit 
“encroaching on the rights of others, disturbing the public peace, 
or otherwise violating criminal laws” in order to protect it.130 
                                                 
122 U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added). 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 45 (3d ed. 2011). 
126 Id.  
127 Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299, 
299–300 (1986). 
128 Witte, Jr. & Nichols, supra note 125, at 46. 
129 Id. 
130 Luther Martin, For the Federal Gazette: No. V., FED GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Mar. 19, 1799, at 2 (“The declaration, that religious faith shall be 
unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts, dictated by religious error.”).  
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With a few exceptions, this is the philosophy of religious 
freedom that has been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.131 
This explains how a civil right could be inherently viewed in a 
utilitarian framework, where the externalities of protecting 
religious freedom have never been ignored. 
But before we engage too deeply in this First Amendment 
free exercise analysis, we need to explain exactly what form this 
claim would make in the context of medical futility. Importantly, 
only state actors can be found to violate the First Amendment, 
as the Constitution only prohibits Congress from making any law 
that would prohibit free exercise.132 This prohibition was 
extended to state governments through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but does not reach private actors serving purely 
private interests.133 Providers could be considered state actors if 
they serve a public function, such as working at the Veteran’s 
Affairs hospitals, a state prison, a county-run clinic, or a public, 
state university hospital.   
The state action needs to have deprived someone of a 
constitutional right, which here would be the freedom of 
religious exercise.134 In medical futility cases, the patient’s family 
would be arguing for an accommodation of their religious belief, 
through an exemption from the state or institution’s medical 
futility law or policy. The patient’s family would argue that 
complying with the policy would require a violation of the 
patient’s religious beliefs of allowing God to act through prayer. 
There are not very many Supreme Court cases that deal precisely 
                                                 
131 Clark B. Lombardi, Nineteenth-Century Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of 
Polygamy: The Relevance of Nineteenth-Century Cases and Commentaries for Contemporary 
Debates About Free Exercise Exemptions, 85 OR. L. REV. 374 (2006); Frederick Mark 
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: 
An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 
(2014). 
132Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role 
of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2004). 
133 In West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court held that a private physician under contract 
with the state to provide medical services at a state hospital is acting as a state actor 
for purposes of § 1983, a federal statute that allows plaintiffs to sue private 
individuals for civil rights violations. See 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988).  
134 “Every exercise of judicial review should begin by identifying a governmental 
actor, a constitutional subject. And every constitutional holding should start by saying 
who has violated the Constitution.” Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the 
Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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with religious freedom exemptions from a state or federal law, 
but these are the cases I will canvass.   
Before determining that the patient should receive an 
exemption from a medical futility law, a court must first 
determine, as a threshold and definitional matter, whether the 
belief at issue is religious.135 Then it must determine whether the 
belief is sincerely held.136 In theory, the First Amendment does 
not allow questioning the empirical basis for the religious belief, 
but in practice, courts may dismiss First Amendment claims that 
are incredulous under either of these prongs.137 In United States v. 
Ballard, the Court states that “[m]en may believe what they 
cannot prove. They may not be put to proof of their religious 
doctrines or beliefs.”138 This means that even if a patient believes 
something unorthodox, while the sincerity of the belief may be 
questioned, the underlying religious belief cannot, so long as it 
passes the threshold test of stemming from a “religion.”139   
This broad deference to whether the belief is religious is 
true even if a patient’s beliefs are different from the beliefs of her 
co-members.140 If a Muslim family believes in a type of 
miraculous religious intervention that would not be shared by 
most Muslims, this does not invalidate the First Amendment 
religious protection. The Court has reasoned that “it is not within 
                                                 
135 “We refused to evaluate the objective reasonableness of the prisoner's belief, 
holding that our ‘scrutiny extends only to whether a claimant sincerely holds a 
particular belief and whether the belief is religious in nature.’ Ford v. McGinnis, 352 
F.3d 582, 590 (2d Cir. 2003); see also, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 
309 F.3d 144, 171 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 942. 
136 William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 308, 310–11 (1991); see Kori Termine, Ford v. McGinnis: Should Courts Really 
Enter the Thicket of Theology? 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 187, 194 (2005). 
137 “A court is more likely to find against a claimant on definitional grounds when 
the religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural norm, and is more likely to find that a 
religious belief is insincere when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, 
incredulous. The religious claims most likely to be recognized, therefore, are those 
that closely parallel or directly relate to the culture's predominant religious 
traditions.” Marshall, supra note 137, at 311 (footnote omitted).  
138 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).  
139 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1970) (adopting broad definition of 
“religion” under draft exemption statutes, but also influenced by constitutional 
concerns); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of 
Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989) (noting that religious claims must be 
deemed genuine unless it is patently “bizarre or incredible”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988) (rejecting inquiry into 
“centrality” of belief or practice on ground that it involves second-guessing believer's 
understanding of his religion). 
140 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
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the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether 
the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the 
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of 
scriptural interpretation.”141 Thus, for First Amendment 
purposes, it is irrelevant whether one Episcopalian holds beliefs 
about miracles that are not shared with other Episcopalians. 
Importantly, the free exercise of “religion” need not be 
limited to obeying mandatory rules set down by a church.  
Although respected First Amendment scholar Doug Laycock 
recognizes that the rights implicated in free exercise are “at a 
maximum when government prohibits what faith 
unambiguously requires, or requires what faith prohibits,”142 he 
and others argue that the Free Exercise Clause must protect more 
than this.143  The practice of religion encompasses more than 
following edicts, because otherwise it would fail to protect most 
religiously motivated practice. The ability to pray at a given 
location or be a member of the ministry are not requirements of 
each member of a faith, but they flow from religious belief. Thus, 
despite lower court rulings to the contrary, if a state law or 
regulation placed a substantial burden on the ability to pray, this 
would likely be considered a substantial burden on religious free 
exercise by the Supreme Court.144   
Despite this broad deference to how an individual 
conceives of her religious belief and religiously motivated 
conduct, the cases based on free exercise have generally not 
turned out favorably for people claiming that their rights have 
been violated.145  As Ira Lupu points out, “[o]n rare occasions, 
application of these standards has produced important victories 
for religious freedom. Far more frequently, however, judges have 
                                                 
141 Id. at 716. 
142 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE 95 (John Witte Jr. ed., 2011). 
143 Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group 
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 142–44 (1989). 
144 But see Brandon v. Board of Education, 635 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1980); Chess v. 
Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 917 (W.D. Mo. 1979). 
145 While this dataset includes claims under the free exercise clause as well as RFRA 
and religiously motivated free speech claims, the plaintiffs’ success rate by two 
researchers was found to be 35.5%. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of 
Religion Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1371, 1387–88 (2013). 
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displayed pseudo-sensitivity to religious freedom.”146 The next 
part of this article will investigate the development of the 
Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence and how it supports 
this assertion. 
 
B. The Development of Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
In 1878, the Court decided Reynolds v. United States, the 
first free exercise case.147 George Reynolds was a member of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) who 
took a second wife and was charged under a criminal anti-
bigamy statute.148 George challenged the criminal statute on free 
exercise grounds.149 The Reynolds Court held that bigamy could 
be considered a crime even though Mormons argued it was part 
of their religious rights, or even duties.150  In this landmark free 
exercise case, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment 
protects religious belief but does not allow exemption from 
otherwise valid laws based on these religious beliefs.151 To permit 
an exemption for Reynolds “would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and 
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”152 
In so holding that the criminal anti-bigamy statute was valid, the 
Court said that “while [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices.”153 This created a 
categorical prohibition on exemptions from generally applicable 
laws (i.e., laws that applied to religious and non-religious 
conduct alike). Reynolds has never been explicitly overruled, but 
its application has been limited.154 For one, the distinction 
between religious belief and conduct that the Reynolds Court 
                                                 
146 Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 39 (2015). 
147 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
148 Id. at 146. 
149 Id. at 162. 
150 Id. at 168. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 167. 
153 Id. at 166. 
154 “Reynolds, despite its age, has never been overruled by the United States Supreme 
Court and, in fact, has been cited by the Court with approval in several modern free 
exercise cases, signaling its continuing vitality.” State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 51 
(2006); and for the limitations on the Reynolds’ holding, see, Brown v. Buhman, 947 
F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1187 (D. Utah 2013), vacated, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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endorsed has been disavowed.155 The clause currently protects 
religious conduct as well as religious belief.156 However, the 
general principle disfavoring exemptions from otherwise valid 
and generally applicable laws remains.157 
The Court made a rhetorical shift in 1961 from 
categorical prohibitions on exemption for generally applicable 
laws.  Instead of categorically prohibiting them, the Court now 
discussed, and found relevant, the burdens imposed on the 
religious believer. In Braunfeld v. Brown,158 Jewish shopkeepers 
argued for an exemption from enforcement of a Pennsylvania 
criminal statute, which prohibited shops from being open on 
Sundays.159 The shopkeepers lost, but the Court nevertheless 
inquired into the burdens that would be imposed on religious 
practice by having to work on their Jewish Sabbath in order to 
stay competitive and comply with mandatory closures on the 
Christian Sabbath.160  The Court also asked whether the 
legislature could draft alternative means of achieving the same 
legislative goals.161 Even though the religious exercise claim 
failed, this was an important rhetorical shift to consider the 
burdens of complying with a generally applicable law.  
Two years later, the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert 
v. Verner162 built upon the language from Braunfeld. In Sherbert, a 
Seventh-day Adventist Church member was denied 
                                                 
155 “In deciding the [Yoder] case in favor of the Amish parents, the Court also 
rejected the state's asserted distinction between regulation of ‘beliefs’ and regulation 
of ‘conduct.’ The Court stated that in cases of this sort, ‘belief and action cannot be 
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.’” See Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the 
Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a 
Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 339 (1991). 
156 Kristen A. Berberick, Marrying into Heaven: The Constitutionality of Polygamy Bans 
Under the Free Exercise Clause, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 105, 115–16 (2007). 
157 Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
158 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
159 Id. at 601–02 (“Appellants contend that the enforcement against them of the 
Pennsylvania statute will prohibit the free exercise of their religion because, due to 
the statute's compulsion to close on Sunday, appellants will suffer substantial 
economic loss, to the benefit of their non-Sabbatarian competitors, if appellants also 
continue their Sabbath observance by closing their businesses on Saturday. . .”).  
160 Id. at 608–09. 
161 Id. at 603 (“Concededly, appellants and all other persons who wish to work on 
Sunday will be burdened economically by the State's day of rest mandate . . . ”); id. at 
608 (“[W]e examined several suggested alternative means by which it was argued 
that the State might accomplish its secular goals without even remotely or 
incidentally affecting religious freedom.”). 
162 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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unemployment benefits because she refused to accept available 
employment that required her to work on Saturday, the day of 
her Sabbath.163 In administrative proceedings under the 
unemployment benefits statute, the tribunal found that the 
restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her 
within the provision disqualifying for benefits, because she 
failed, without good cause, to accept “suitable work when 
offered . . . by the employment office or the employer . . . .”164  
Here, the Supreme Court upheld her free exercise claim by 
applying strict scrutiny, a framework born of the First 
Amendment speech protections but maturing in other 
doctrines.165 
Specifically in Sherbert, the Court asked whether the 
generally applicable and facially neutral unemployment 
regulations imposed a burden on the free exercise of the 
appellant’s religion, and whether the regulations were necessary 
to satisfy a compelling state interest.166 As to the first 
requirement, the Court easily found that the law burdened her 
religious exercise.167  The Court stated that the benefits ruling 
“force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning 
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the 
other hand.”168 It reasoned that the government imposing such a 
choice burdens free exercise in the same way as fining her for 
Saturday worship.169 
Next, the Court asked whether the state’s regulations 
were the least restrictive possible to further a compelling state 
interest.170 The Court answered in the negative, saying that “even 
if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the 
[unemployment] fund and disrupt the scheduling of [Saturday] 
work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to 
                                                 
163 Id. at 399–400. 
164 Id. at 401. 
165 Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 357 (2006). 
166 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 404. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 407. 
 
2017] MEDICAL FUTILITY 73 
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would 
combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment 
rights.”171 The appellees did not assert this interest before the 
state court, and even if they had, they failed to demonstrate that 
it was the least restrictive means possible.172  
Addressing whether the state’s interests could have been 
deemed compelling, had they been raised, the Court emphasized 
that “[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount 
interests” could justify burdening Sherbert’s religion.173 Seeing 
no compelling asserted interests in denying benefits to Sherbert, 
the Court held that the Free Exercise clause had been violated.174  
Sherbert created a new constitutional standard for testing First 
Amendment Free Exercise cases that employed the strict 
scrutiny test from Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.175 That 
is, Free Exercise cases now included an inquiry into the relative 
religious burdens on the claimant, and whether the advanced 
state interests in the law are compelling and the least restrictive 
possible.176  
For nearly three decades, the Court employed the Sherbert 
test to free exercise claims in many different contexts.177  It has 
been said that during this time the Court was “too willing to 
create exceptions to the doctrine, and lower courts were too 
willing to find that free exercise rights were not burdened and 
that governmental interests were compelling.”178 According to 
Douglas Laycock, during this time courts routinely 
underestimated the burdens imposed and overestimated the 
importance of governmental interests.179 Even so, the test 
remained and the Court continued to inquire into the religious 
burdens imposed by religiously neutral laws.180 The next 
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
174 Id. at 409–410. 
175 Id. at 403. 
176 Id. 
177 LAYCOCK, supra note 142, at 393. 
178 Id. at 393. 
179 Id. at 394. 
180 See id 
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landmark case to employ Sherbert was Wisconsin v. Yoder, decided 
in 1972.181 
In Yoder, members of the Amish religion were convicted 
of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law.182 
Instead of attending school until the age of sixteen, as the law 
required, the Amish provided their own vocational education 
after the eighth grade.183    
The Court in Yoder held that the Free Exercise Clause 
relieved adult members of the “Old Order Amish” from the 
obligation to send their children to school until the age of 
sixteen.184 The Court argued that respondents have amply 
supported their claim “that enforcement of the compulsory 
formal education requirement after the eighth grade would 
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious 
beliefs.”185 Complying with Wisconsin’s law would mean that 
the members would receive not only the “censure of the church 
community,” but would also “endanger their own salvation and 
that of their children.”186 This presented a significant burden on 
their religious free exercise.187  
The Court also found that the state interest was not 
compelling.188 This was not as applied generally to the state’s 
interest in public education, but in the specific state interest in 
requiring public education until the age of sixteen for the Amish 
in this case.189 The Amish experts testified at trial, without 
challenge, that a few extra years of compulsory education  
may be necessary when its goal is the preparation 
of the child for life in modern society as the 
majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of 
education be viewed as the preparation of the child 
                                                 
181 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 205. 
184 Id. at 234–35. 
185 Id. at 205. 
186 Id. at 209. 
187 Yoder, at 220–21. 
188 Id. at 222. 
189 Id. at 221. 
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for life in the separated agrarian community that 
is the keystone of the Amish faith.190  
Moreover, the Amish provided an “ideal vocational education 
for their children in the adolescent years,” in case they should 
choose to leave the faith.191 
Like Sherbert, Yoder also used the language of “burdening” 
the believers and requiring “compelling” state interests, and 
seems to perform a cost-benefit analysis that stacks up the net 
benefits and burdens to the claimants and the state.192  The Court 
ruled in favor of the Amish, but only after a thorough assessment 
of the impact of the exemption on the state and the religious 
believers.193  Notably, the Court seemed impressed by the 
historical roots of the Amish people’s religious requests, and the 
fact that this was a sincere and deeply held belief that was integral 
to their religious faith.194  Future cases would challenge the 
relevance of this finding of sincerity and centrality, but this dicta 
raises interesting questions for medical futility cases that will be 
discussed later in the article. Yoder remained the high-water mark 
in terms of protecting religious liberties well into the 1980s.195 
After this case, the Supreme Court retreated, and there were very 
few victories for Free Exercise claimants.196 Those who did 
succeed demonstrated explicit discrimination against religion or 
denials of unemployment compensation, as in Sherbert.197  
                                                 
190 Id. at 222. 
191 Id. at 224. 
192 Id. at 229. 
193 Id. at 236. 
194 Id. at 205 (“Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect 
and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the 
Amish have demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship 
of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the 
continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by 
the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.”). 
195 See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When A "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the 
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception", 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 
573, 577 (2003) (“Wisconsin v. Yoder was, in many ways, the high water mark of 
free exercise mandated exemptions.”). 
196 “While the Court continually rejected the claims of free exercise plaintiffs, it 
continued to invoke the language of the compelling state interest test. It thus 
appeared that the Supreme Court had settled on applying a watered-down version of 
strict scrutiny in the area of free exercise.” See id. at 579. 
197 Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Exercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne: 
Charting a Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105 n.44 (1998); Daniel A. Crane, Beyond 
RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
235, 246 (1998) (“Putting aside the unemployment compensation cases, not since 
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This then brings us to the case of Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith.198  This case changed everything.199 In this 
case, petitioners were fired from their jobs at a private drug 
rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote for sacramental 
purposes at a ceremony of their Native American church.200 They 
sought review of the denial of their unemployment benefits, 
claiming that their use of the hallucinogen peyote should not 
have been considered criminal misconduct, making them 
ineligible for benefits.201 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality 
opinion, which found that their free exercise rights had not been 
violated.202 The Court held that to grant an exemption from a 
religiously-neutral law would place the employees “beyond the 
reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their 
religious practice. . . .”203 Justice Scalia went on to say that the 
collection of a general tax might offend the religious freedom of 
those who do not believe in supporting organized government, 
but they would still be required to pay the tax.204 If burdening 
religion “is not the object of the tax, but merely the incidental 
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the 
First Amendment has not been offended.”205 Heretofore, indirect 
burdens on religious practices that apply equally to the religious 
and non-religious would not be considered violations of the First 
Amendment’s free exercise clause.  
The plurality opinion dismantled the Sherbert test, which 
had required demonstrating that a law that substantially 
burdened religion be the least restrictive necessary to fulfill a 
compelling state interest. Justice Scalia noted that “[i]n recent 
years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside 
the unemployment compensation field) at all” and he then listed 
many different cases where the Court did not require the 
                                                 
Yoder had the Supreme Court required an exemption from a generally applicable law 
on free exercise grounds.”). 
198 Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
199 See Aden & Strang, supra note 195. 
200 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. 
201 Id. at 872. 
202 Id. at 874. 
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government to advance a compelling state interest.206  The Court 
therefore argued that even if they were to apply it to the present 
case, they would not use it to require a religious exemption from 
an otherwise neutral and generally applicable law.207 In strong 
terms, the Court stated that it has “never held that an individual's 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”208 
The scrutinizing framework of Sherbert and Yoder were being 
completely undone. 
1. Applying Current First Amendment Free Exercise 
Precedent to Medical Futility Statutes 
So long as Smith holds, it is exceedingly unlikely that 
existing medical futility statutes could be found to violate a 
patient’s First Amendment Free Exercise of religion. While not 
technically required by any religious faith, belief in the power of 
prayer to heal the sick is motivated by religion and the free 
exercise protections ought to apply. The threshold finding that 
the statutes impact the practice of religion should be met. Courts 
might disagree on whether the statutes place a substantial burden 
on religion. Because this component mirrors the analysis under 
the federal and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
(RFRA), this prong will be examined in the next subsection of 
the Article. 
Smith holds that for First Amendment purposes, a 
generally applicable law will not violate free exercise if it is at 
least related to legitimate government interests.209  The unilateral 
withdrawal of futile treatment that is permitted under the futility 
statutes applies generally to religious patients and non-religious 
patients alike.210 The medical futility statutes are thus neutral 
                                                 
206 Id. at 883–84. 
207 “Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the 
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions 
from a generally applicable criminal law.” Id. at 884, superseded by statute, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 
16, 1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4. 
208 Id. at 878–79. 
209 Id. at 884. 
210 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §13.52.060 (West 2016); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4735, 4736 
(West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-
7 (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §5-807 (West 2016); MISS. CODE 
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laws that do not mention religious beliefs as a basis for 
withdrawal or continuance of care. While some requests for 
futile care might be religiously motivated, many requests have 
nothing to do with religion at all.  And as Smith declared, even if 
the religiously-neutral medical futility statutes incidentally 
burden the exercise of religion, these will not be invalidated 
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Prior to 
Smith, the relative burdens on religion and benefits to the state 
would need to be assessed for First Amendment purposes.211 The 
state would have had to show that its interests in passing the 
medical futility statutes were compelling.212 After Smith, 
however, the challenge is much easier to overcome. The 
generally applicable and facially neutral medical futility statutes 
would not be considered unconstitutional. 
However, as much of the preceding case analysis 
probably made clear, in a medical futility case the plaintiffs’ 
claims would be even weaker than for those decided by the 
Supreme Court in the past. In Smith, Yoder, and Braunfeld, the 
plaintiffs were not arguing that they should be able to require 
some third party to act. Rather, they were arguing that they 
should be exempt from legal sanctions for acting (or not acting) 
themselves. This is a very important difference, which spells 
unlikely success for a religious patient praying for a miracle.  
In the case of a challenge to a medical futility statute, the 
religious challengers would be seeking medically futile care, 
which would require the conscription of objecting hospital staff 
who may or may not be state actors, as well as the use of 
insurance resources to cover the oversight and use of the medical 
equipment in a way that might violate the clinical standard of 
care. Even under an analysis akin to that which the Sherbert or 
Yoder court undertook, it is quite unlikely religious patients 
would prevail given the moral and economic costs imposed on 
                                                 
ANN. § 41-41-215 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-62, 26:2H:65 (West 2016); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7 (West 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808 (West 
2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 35-22-408 (West 2016). 
211 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
212 Id. at 406. 
 
2017] MEDICAL FUTILITY 79 
third-parties.213 As Frederick Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van 
Tassel point out, permissive accommodations under the Free 
Exercise Clause may violate the Establishment Clause when they 
externalize the cost of protecting religious freedom to non-
believing third-parties such as private hospitals and their staff.214 
Unlike permissive religious accommodations that may be 
allowed by patients or providers, the structural bars on 
establishing religion cannot be waived by patients, providers, or 
the hospital staff.215  Thus, to the extent that medical futility 
statutes or policies carve out religious reasons for special 
treatment to protect free exercise, the cost-shifting to non-
believing third-parties (patients who do not receive ventilator 
support because they are being used by religious patients, or 
providers who morally object to providing this care) could then 
violate the Establishment Clause.216 
Additionally, the net burdens and benefits skew sharply 
against the hospital and insurance company, making the 
accommodation less permissible. The denial of extra time to wait 
for a miracle may indirectly burden religious practice, but the 
significance of this burden is hard to quantify. In a medical 
futility case, the patient’s family is never prohibited from praying 
for a miracle, they are just prohibited from requiring the providers 
to perform certain tasks while they pray for a miracle.217 However, 
if we are to give any independent content to the idea of a 
“substantive burden,” the likelihood of the outcome of the 
religious exercise must matter as well as the magnitude of what 
                                                 
213 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 131, at 349 (“[T]he Court condemns permissive 
accommodations on Establishment Clause grounds when the accommodations 
impose significant burdens on third parties who do not believe or participate in the 
accommodated practice.”). 
214 Id.  
215 Id. at 347 (“[T]he Establishment Clause is a structural bar on government action 
rather than a guarantee of personal rights. Violations of the Establishment Clause 
cannot be waived by the parties or balanced away by weightier private or 
government interests, as can violations of the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
216 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 132, at 357 (“[These] decisions demonstrate 
the Court's general rejection of accommodations that shift the costs of 
accommodating a religion from those who practice it to those who don’t.”). 
217 For example, the Texas medical futility statute provides that “[t]he attending 
physician, any other physician responsible for the care of the patient, and the health 
care facility are not obligated to provide life-sustaining treatment after the 10th day 
after both the written decision and the patient's medical record required under 
Subsection (b) are provided to the patient or the person responsible for the health 
care decisions of the patient” , but there is no mention of any prohibition on the 
patient’s ability to pray during this procedure. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
166.046 (West 2016). 
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is lost by no accommodation. If hospitals recognized religious 
exemptions for those demanding futile care, there may be no 
limit to the requests. Hospitals would run out of space and 
equipment. This would be exacerbated by the difficulty 
discerning the sincere religious requests from the insincere, a 
topic we will take up later in the Article.218   
 
2. The Response to Smith – the Federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) 
Academics, politicians, religious leaders, and the media 
were quick to condemn the Smith opinion.219 Three prominent 
First Amendment scholars described the decision as a “sweeping 
disaster for religious liberty” while Congressman Stephen J. 
Solarz declared that “the Supreme Court has virtually removed 
religious freedom from the Bill of Rights.”220 Congress responded 
to the Smith decision by passing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) three years later in 1993.221 Supported 
by a diverse coalition of members of Congress and signed into 
law by President Clinton, RFRA reintroduced the compelling 
interest test as a statutory right.222  More precisely, the goal of 
RFRA was to prevent governments at all levels (local, state, and 
federal) from substantially burdening Free Exercise rights with 
generally applicable laws unless the government satisfied strict 
scrutiny, that is, the law was the least restrictive possible to 
further a compelling state interest.223   
                                                 
218 Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (“In a few cases, however, a 
claimed exemption, though tolerable on its own, raises a strong risk of bringing on 
many others, and so poses ‘a substantial threat to public safety or order . . . 
sometimes granting an exemption will produce ‘an administrative problem of such 
magnitude’ as to ‘render the entire statutory scheme unworkable.’. . . The threat of 
cumulative exemptions comes not only from other sincere religious objectors, but 
from other persons who could feign the same objection to get the benefits of 
exemption. The First Amendment itself hampers the government in uncovering such 
‘strategic behavior,’ because the government cannot adopt too narrow a definition of 
what beliefs or practices are ‘religious’ or inquire too closely into their sincerity or 
their importance to the believer.”). 
219 See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 (1992) (“Members of the media, academics, 
members of Congress, and religious interest groups greeted the decision with 
condemnation and despair.”). 
220 Id. at 1409–10. 
221 Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: 
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2013).  
222 Id. 
223 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (West 2016). 
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Through RFRA, Congress sought to undo the 
consequences of the Court's Smith decision and restore a 
statutory standard that was more protective of religious 
freedom.224 Though many others have advanced this argument, 
the fact that RFRA was never successfully challenged on 
Establishment Clause grounds is perplexing.225 However, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute and has not deemed it 
unconstitutional, at least as applied to federal government 
action.226 In fact, in Gonzales v. O Centro, the Supreme Court 
validated a “focused” read of RFRA that heightened the burden 
on the federal government.227 
The Supreme Court did find that RFRA had overstepped 
its bounds as it applied to the states.  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the 
Court announced that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth 
Amendment authority by enacting legislation designed to 
enforce the Free Exercise Clause against the states.228 In so 
doing, the Court declared that RFRA cannot be applied to the 
states.229 However, while it left undecided whether RFRA is also 
unconstitutional at the federal level, subsequent case law has 
apparently decided this in the negative.230   
The Boerne case has a significant impact on Free Exercise 
claims, as only a fraction of laws that burden religious exercise 
                                                 
224 Heise & Sisk, supra note 221, at 1373. 
225 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 453 (1994) (“Supreme 
Court decisions make clear that the constitutional power to accommodate religious 
practice does not license the state to confer privileges upon religious believers 
indiscriminately.”); see Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: 
Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 285–86 (1994); see also 
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption 
for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 
54 (2014). 
226 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).  
227 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 419–
20 (2006) (“[T]he Government [must] demonstrate that the compelling interest test is 
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular 
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”). 
228 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (“Although Congress certainly can enact legislation 
enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion . . . its §5 power ‘to 
enforce’ is only preventive or ‘remedial,’ . . . . The Amendment's design and § 5's text 
are inconsistent with any suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the 
substance of the Amendment's restrictions on the States.”) (citations omitted). 
229 Id. at 534–535. 
230 Aurora R. Bearse, RFRA: Is It Necessary? Is It Proper?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1045, 
1045 n.4 (1998). 
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are federal ones. Most religious liberty disputes arise over state 
and local laws.231 This is the case with medical futility statutes 
and unilateral decisions to withdraw treatment.  The statutes are 
passed and implemented at the state level, and so the federal 
RFRA would not apply. This puts a sharp halt to any federal 
RFRA analysis. 
 
a. The Response to Boerne—state RFRAs 
In the aftermath of Boerne, RFRA supporters began 
lobbying in their state capitals for state versions of the federal 
law.232 Within just a few years, RFRA legislation had been 
proposed in several states.233 Advocacy groups that were 
traditionally considered at odds with one another came together 
to marshal RFRA through state legislatures, and “[t]he results 
generally rewarded their efforts.” 234   
These state RFRAs have now been passed by 21 states 
and Congress.235  The state acts are modeled on the federal law, 
requiring strict scrutiny when a state law burdens the exercise of 
religion.236 There are significant differences between states in 
terms of the threshold burden on religion that is required and 
whether there are areas where the law does not apply. Regardless 
of the differences, however, the Smith case remains the 
constitutional floor for protecting free exercise under the First 
Amendment.237 States are allowed to create greater protections, 
which most of the RFRAs do, but they cannot protect religious 
                                                 
231 Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2010). 
232 James A. Hanson, Missouri's Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A New Approach to 
the Cause of Conscience, 69 MO. L. REV. 853, 856 (2004). 
233 See Jason Goldman, Religious Freedom: Why States Are Unconstitutionally Burdening 
Their Own Citizens As They "Lower" the Burden, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 57, 
60–61 (2015). 
234 Hanson, supra note 232, at 856. 
235 See 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-
state-rfra-legislation.aspx (“Seventeen states have introduced legislation this year 
regarding the creation of, or alteration to, a state religious freedom law. Currently, 21 
states have Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs).”); see also 42 U.S.C. ch. 
21B (West 2016) (Congress passed RFRA in 1993). 
236 See Mark Strasser, Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks: On State RFRAs 
and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335, 358 (2015). 
237 Lund, supra note 231, at 493. 
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free exercise less than Smith (i.e., permitting intentional religious 
discrimination).238   
State courts have struggled to interpret state RFRAs.239 
Quite puzzlingly, some state courts have equated the strict 
scrutiny standard from their RFRA with the watered-down 
scrutiny of Smith, and others have interpreted their RFRA to 
provide less protection than Smith.240 Religious liberty claims 
should be analyzed differently under the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. This is because Supreme Court 
jurisprudence controls Free Exercise claims, while statutory 
interpretation applies to state RFRA claims.241 What the state 
RFRAs have in common, however, is a requirement that the 
burden on religion be motivated by compelling state interests, as 
opposed to mere legitimate ones.  
To invoke most state RFRAs, the plaintiff needs to show 
that the governmental action placed a “substantial burden” on 
the plaintiff's exercise of a sincere religious belief.242 If this 
threshold requirement is not met, then no claim or defense is 
available under many RFRAs.243 Because the state interest in the 
law must only be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state 
interest if religion is found to be burdened, the threshold 
definition of “burden” under the state RFRAs is quite important.  
Some states (such as Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas) 
have not included a statutory definition of “substantial burden” 
in their RFRAs, leaving the courts to define this term.244 Four 
state legislatures provided their understanding of what the term 
should mean.245  Arizona’s definition appears the broadest, as it 
states “the term substantially burden is intended solely to ensure 
                                                 
238 See Michael D. Currie, Scrutiny Mutiny: Why the Iowa Supreme Court Should Reject 
Employment Division v. Smith and Adopt A Strict Scrutiny Standard for Free-Exercise 
Claims Arising Under the Iowa Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1377 (2014); see also 
Lund, supra note 231, at 466. 
239 Lund, supra note 231, at 485–86. 
240 Id. at 486. 
241 Hanson, supra note 232, at 857. 
242 Lund, supra note 232, at 477. 
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244 James W. Wright, Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments 
Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 425, 433 (2010). 
245 Id.  
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that this article is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis 
infractions.”246 Idaho and Oklahoma’s RFRAs state that to 
substantially burden religious exercise is merely to “inhibit or 
curtail religiously motivated practices.”247 Pennsylvania’s 
statutory definition is the most detailed, and includes any act 
that:  
(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or 
expression mandated by a person's sincerely held 
religious beliefs. 
(2) Significantly curtails a person's ability to 
express adherence to the person's religious faith. 
(3) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to 
engage in activities which are fundamental to the 
person's religion. 
(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates 
a specific tenet of a person's religious faith.248 
Now, let us apply this detailed definition to the medical 
futility case at hand. One characterization of the burden could be 
that state RFRA medical futility statutes impose no substantial 
burden on religious exercise. At any point in the patient’s life, the 
family can pray for a miracle. No state medical futility law 
prohibits prayer. The question in these potential cases is whether 
the family should be allowed to pray under a specific set of 
conditions—namely, while the patient is being supported by 
artificial life support. No Supreme Court or RFRA case supports 
this expansive of a view of religious liberty, as this certainly 
“encroaches” on the rights of others; namely, the rights of the 
providers not to be required to provide futile care at the expense 
of other patients who might need their services.249  
                                                 
246 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(e) (West 2016). 
247 Wright, Jr., supra note 244, at 434. 
248 71 P.S. § 2403 (West 2016). 
249See Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging 
Health Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 1481–1482 (1995) (“When initially 
enacted, the Conscience Clauses protected recipients of federal funds and their staffs 
from being required to participate in abortion or sterilization procedures that 
conflicted with the providers' religious or moral beliefs. One year later, Congress 
expanded the Conscience Clauses to permit a health care provider to refuse to 
perform any health service or research that conflicts with personal religious or moral 
beliefs.”); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care 
Providers, 14 J. OF LEGAL MED. 177, 177 (1993); see also 42 U.S.C. 300a-7(d) (2000). 
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However, under a few state RFRAs, the denial of 
additional time to pray for a miracle might meet the threshold 
statutory definition of “burden.”250 Specifically, under Idaho or 
Oklahoma’s RFRAs, the denial of life support while the patient 
prays for a miracle could be said to “inhibit or curtail religiously 
motivated practices,” such as praying for a miracle. Under 
Arizona’s definition of a burden, the denial of life support while 
the patient or his family prays for a miracle would also likely not 
be considered a trivial infraction of religious free exercise, given 
that these are often life and death situations of tremendous 
spiritual and religious significance. In these states where it could 
be found that the denial of futile treatment results in a burden of 
religious exercise, the state would then need to demonstrate that 
the medical futility laws are narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest.251  
 
b. Multiple Compelling State Interests Exist to Deny Religious 
Exemptions from Medical Futility Laws 
Although the states employ different thresholds for what 
counts as a sufficient burden, each requires that the state advance 
a compelling interest in the legislation.252 When determining 
whether a state’s interest is compelling, the courts in most states 
have said they look to First Amendment jurisprudence.253  Thus, 
the compelling interest inquiry would resemble that under the 
Smith and pre-Smith decisions, discussed above.  
What is the compelling state interest in medical futility 
laws?  There are several state interests that would likely be 
considered compelling, if the state or federal courts correctly 
interpreted existing strict scrutiny standards from Sherbert and 
other constitutional precedents. While “only those interests of 
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion[,]”254 the medical 
futility statutes could rather easily clear this hurdle. The states’ 
                                                 
250 See Goldman, supra note 233, at 69 (describing the different conceptions of 
“burden” under state RFRAs). 
251 Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 605, 627–28 (1999). 
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S.D. L. REV. 466, 478 (2010). 
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compelling interests in prohibiting religious exemptions from 
medical futility statutes could be:   
1) respecting provider autonomy,  
2) respecting physician’s professional ethics and 
integrity by blurring the line between healing and 
harming, 
3) not allowing professional standards of care to be 
trumped by religious requests,  
4)   preserving scarce resources in the event of an epidemic 
or other public health need,  
5)  the inability to distinguish the potentially abundant 
religiously insincere from sincere claims, and/or 
6)  the need for some principled and generally-applicable 
basis for terminating potentially indefinite life 
support. 
Any of these could satisfy strict scrutiny, and some already 
have.255 For starters, both Congress and the Supreme Court have 
recognized the need to protect the autonomy, religious beliefs, 
and professional standards of health care providers.256 Physicians 
should not be required to perform treatments that run afoul of 
their conscience or professional ethics, just because a patient or 
his family is requesting it.257  
The Church Amendment, which was passed by Congress 
in 1973, made clear that the receipt of federal Medicare funds 
would not provide a basis for mandating a health care provider 
“to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization 
procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the 
performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary to 
                                                 
255 See infra pp. 42–50. 
256 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997); see also United States v. 
Lachman, 48 F.3d at586, 592–593;93 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 70 
N.J. 10, 44 (1976) overruled by Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 (1985); Dennies 
Varughese, Conscience Misbranded!: Introducing the Performer v. Facilitator Model for 
Determining the Suitability of Including Pharmacists Within Conscience Clause Legislation, 
79 TEMP. L. REV. 649, 659 (2006). 
257 See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's 
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1260 (1993) (“While concern for a 
physician compromising his or her own concept of professional integrity may seem 
to have no place in the world of patient autonomy, in fact both courts and 
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his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”258 It also provided that 
no “entity” could be compelled to “make its facilities available 
for the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if 
[such] performance . . . is prohibited by the entity on the basis of 
religious beliefs or moral convictions.”259  The protection of a 
physician’s rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion 
is “clearly a compelling state interest.”260 Many states then 
enacted other healthcare refusal laws in the wake of the Church 
Amendment.261  These laws did not just exempt providers from 
performing abortions or sterilizations, but were expanded to 
include contraceptive and other practices that the provider might 
consider immoral.262  Medical futility statutes are just one type of 
these laws.263  
In the context of physician-assisted suicide and 
reproductive rights, the Supreme Court has found that physicians 
are unique, and the state has an interest in preserving their 
professional ethics and maintaining a distinction between 
physician’s duties to heal rather than harm.264 As evidenced by a 
related survey I conducted and published elsewhere,265 providers 
think administering futile treatment is unethical as they feel they 
are potentially harming a patient through forced ventilation or 
feeding without offering any clinical benefit.266 When a patient is 
on a ventilator, or breathing machine, she cannot speak and is 
heavily sedated so that the breathing is relaxed.267 This means 
that the providers have to use indirect measures to assess 
                                                 
258 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2012). 
259 § 300a-7(b)(2)(A). 
260 Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice 
Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 167 (2003). 
261 Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2538 (2015). 
262 Id. 
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264 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (“The State also has an 
interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. . . . 
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harming.”).  
265 Brown I, supra note 42. 
266 Id.  
267 What to Expect While on a Ventilator, NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD 
INSTITUTE (Feb. 2011), https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-
topics/topics/vent/while; see also Judith Ann Tate et al., Anxiety and Agitation in 
Mechanically Ventilated Patients, 22 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RESEARCH 157, 157 (2012). 
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discomfort. They cannot ask the patient directly whether she is 
in pain. In some cases, the patient might need to have her hands 
tied down so that she does not regain consciousness and try to 
pull the irritating breathing tube out of her mouth.268 Forcing 
providers to administer medically ineffective treatment that 
might cause great discomfort to the patient compromises the 
professional ethics of the medical community, and blurs the line 
between healing and harming. This provides a second 
compelling state interest in denying a religious exemption to 
medical futility laws.  
Even the staunchest of religious freedom supporters 
recognize that public health and safety concerns present 
compelling state interests.269 During the last swine flu outbreak, 
many public health authorities realized they needed to develop 
guidelines on the proper rationing of ventilators in the event of 
another flu epidemic.270  This was in response to hospitals being 
at capacity with their ventilators, and states not having policies 
in place for how to best allocate these scarce and expensive 
resources.271 If religious patients could commandeer the use of 
the ventilator indefinitely with First Amendment protection, this 
could thwart public health efforts. This presents another robust 
                                                 
268 Lorraine Mion et al., Patient-Initiated Device Removal in Intensive Care Units: A 
National Prevalence Study, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2714, 2715 (2007) 
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and compelling state interest in denying a religious exemption to 
medical futility laws.  
In addition to these professional autonomy and public 
health compelling interests, the state has an interest in preventing 
“an administrative problem of such magnitude” as to render the 
religious exemptions unworkable.272 In the context of medical 
futility statutes, the state’s interest here is exceedingly strong. 
The basis for this interest is the inability of distinguishing 
between sincere and insincere religious requests.273 A state’s 
interest may become compelling when viewed in the aggregate, 
even if it might not be as compelling when viewed through one 
specific claim.274 As William Marshall explains,  
[i]f, for example, one factory is exempt from anti-
pollution requirements, the state's interest in 
protecting air quality will not be seriously 
disturbed. When many factories pollute, on the 
other hand, the state interest is seriously 
threatened. Weighing the state interest against a 
narrow class seeking exemption is similar to 
asking whether this particular straw is the one 
that breaks the camel's back.275  
The 2014 Hobby Lobby case made clear that the compelling state 
interest should be determined by looking “beyond broadly 
formulated interests” to “scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of 
granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”276 
This means that the state should question whether the marginal 
interest is compelling in denying this particular type of exemption to 
this class as opposed to its global state interest in passing the 
statute as it applies to everyone.  
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c. The Compelling Interests Must Also Be the Least Restrictive Means 
Necessary 
Even though promoting professional autonomy and 
ethics and public health interests are each considered 
compelling, just as with all other state interests, they must also 
be the least restrictive necessary.277 The Seventh Circuit recently 
reminded us in the context of the Affordable Care Act’s 
mandatory contraception coverage, “[s]trict scrutiny requires a 
substantial congruity—a close ‘fit’—between the governmental 
interest and the means chosen to further that interest. . . . There 
are many ways to promote public health and gender equality, 
almost all of them less burdensome on religious liberty.”278 The 
government cannot prevail by articulating general compelling 
interests.279 The contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby 
ultimately failed for this reason, as the Supreme Court conceded 
that the state interests in not requiring cost-sharing for women 
might be compelling.280 However, those challenging the mandate 
successfully argued that the federal government could subsidize 
the purchase of contraceptives for employees whose religious 
employers rejected coverage.281 This meant that the mandatory 
contraception coverage violated the federal RFRA because it was 
not the least restrictive means necessary for furthering the cost-
sharing and public health interests.282 Because the various state 
RFRAs also require strict scrutiny, the state’s interests must also 
satisfy this “least restrictive” burden.283 However, for some of the 
states’ interests in medical futility statutes, this burden is more 
easily overcome.  
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As applied to medical futility statutes, there are, indeed, 
other ways the state could control against the inability to ration 
life-sustaining care in the event of a pandemic. Specifically, the 
state could suspend medical futility statutes in the event of a 
pandemic, but not before. Therefore, a medical futility statute 
that applies in non-pandemic situations may not be considered 
the least restrictive necessary for this particular need to ration 
life-saving technologies during public health crises. The states 
would need to advance another compelling interest to ensure 
that the statute passes a state RFRA analysis. 
A better source for upholding medical futility statutes is 
the state’s interest in professional autonomy and ethics. Medical 
futility statutes that do not provide adequate means for the 
patient to transfer (e.g., by not affording the family a sufficient 
amount of time to locate an alternative facility) might violate a 
state RFRA by not being the least restrictive means necessary to 
further this specific government interest. However, if the statute 
provides for some amount of notice to the patient or his family 
and an opportunity to find an alternative provider, it would likely 
satisfy strict scrutiny. The state could argue that the provider’s 
autonomy is not excessively infringed if the provider must give 
the family a week’s notice before terminating futile treatments. 
But the physician’s autonomy and professional ethics would be 
violated by forcing them, on the patient’s religious grounds, to 
provide indefinite futile treatments. The state has a clear interest 
in limiting the patients’ ability to commandeer providers in this 
way. 
The state’s interest in managing the administrative 
burden bolsters the “least restrictive” prong of strict scrutiny. As 
Thomas Berg explains, “[t]he threat of cumulative exemptions 
comes not only from other sincere religious objectors, but from 
other persons who could feign the same objection to get the 
benefits of exemption.”284 Further, the text of the First 
Amendment constrains any deep scrutiny into desperate patients 
who might try to game the system, because the state cannot 
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inquire too closely into whether the belief is truly religious, 
sincere, or even shared with other members of the same faith.285  
Given that many people find religion and God near the 
end of their lives and in response to medical crisis, limiting the 
exemptions to a manageable number would be impossible. Here 
the analysis of whether the interest is compelling dovetails with 
the question of whether the statute is the least restrictive means 
necessary. The fact that there is no way to more narrowly tailor 
the statute to protect religious freedoms renders the interest in 
categorical non-exemption compelling and also the least 
restrictive means necessary. 
Any patient could request that they be provided indefinite 
life support on religious grounds. This could happen if patients 
became aware that this was the only way to receive futile 
treatment. The inability to distinguish sincere from insincere 
claims, and the likelihood that most patients could feign sudden 
belief in miracles bolsters the state’s claim that the statutes are 
the least restrictive means possible to further the stated legislative 
interests. The nature of medical futility decisions is unique. 
There are no alternatives to indefinitely providing futile 
treatments. The only potential concession, though not an 
alternative, is to grant these patients a certain amount of time to 
pray for a miracle, which many providers (and futility statutes) 
already do.286 Unilateral withdrawal is almost never invoked 
unless the team has already given the patient a significant 
amount of time to recover.287 Despite this, there must be some 
principled limit on the amount of time a patient or his surrogate 
could mandate clinically futile care. Otherwise, without a limit, 
once clinically futile treatment is provided, it becomes impossible 
to introduce another non-arbitrary reason for withdrawing the 
treatment at a later date. The medical standard of care provides 
that principled limit. Any other standard introduces an arbitrary 
limit, and creates its own potential for unfair discrimination.  
Contrast this with the religious freedom cases where 
exemptions were granted. The exemptions from working on the 
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Sabbath, are not likely to overwhelm employers or employee 
benefit programs. For personal reasons, other employees will 
choose to work on Saturdays and a minority of religions 
celebrate a Saturday Sabbath. In those contexts, the fear of 
numerous (even feigned) religious exemptions does not swallow 
the statute and make it unworkable. There is potential for high 
school students to request not to finish high school on religious 
grounds, such as those made by the Old Order Amish in Yoder.288  
However, either the Supreme Court was not concerned that these 
exemptions would overwhelm the states or they felt that in that 
particular case the Old Order Amish had demonstrated sufficient 
sincerity and vocational alternatives.289 Either way, respected 
religious freedom scholars such as Douglas Laycock agree that 
“the number of potential claims is relevant to assessing the 
government's interest . . . if the government has a compelling 
interest in denying exemption to the whole group of similarly 
situated objectors, it also has a compelling interest in denying 
exemption to each one of them.”290   
d. There Are at Least Three Compelling State Interests that Are the 
Least Restrictive Means Necessary 
There are at least three state interests that are compelling 
and the least restrictive means necessary. These are: a) respect 
for the professional autonomy of physicians, b) the need to 
distinguish harming patients from healing, and c) the need to 
manage the administrative burden of numerous claims. Given 
the multiple compelling state interests in denying a religious 
exemption in medical futility cases, and the inability to 
accommodate religious believers without exposing hospitals 
and providers to an unlimited conscription of services, it seems 
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quite unlikely that a petitioner would prevail on state RFRA 
grounds.   
 
i.Religious Patients Would Likely Not Prevail on a Free Exercise Claim 
Given that the medical futility statutes likely satisfy the 
strict scrutiny required of the state RFRAs, they therefore also 
satisfy the lesser-included rational basis test required of the First 
Amendment. Recall that following Smith, the federal 
Constitution does not require a state’s interest in the statute to be 
compelling if it is generally-applicable, which all of the medical 
futility statutes are.291  The federal RFRA does not apply to state 
laws.  Therefore, we can conclude that religious patients 
claiming that medical futility statutes violate their religious free 
exercise will have a very difficult time prevailing.  Even so, this 




Unfortunately, when physicians concern themselves 
chiefly with the legal ramifications, they lose sight of the 
important ethical dimensions of these cases. Whereas the courts 
are not allowed to inquire into whether a patient’s religious belief 
is sincere or shared with members of their faith, this is precisely 
what a chaplain or social worker should do. Outside of the 
domain of constitutional law, one medical scholar claimed that:  
[c]laims about miracles may . . . be subjected to 
scrutiny according to the criteria of the patient’s 
faith. Faith is, in this sense, public and not 
private. Judging the authenticity of patients’ or 
families’ claims about miracles therefore 
involves examining such claims in light of the 
deposit of faith of the person’s own religious 
tradition.292   
Knowing whether the patient shares these beliefs with members 
of her faith is crucial to ruling out denial or negative 
psychological coping. In many cases where a patient begs for 
more time for a miracle to occur, the patient is likely unprepared 
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for death and expressing this in terms of needing a divine 
intervention. Inquiring into the basis of the belief in miracles 
would allow the clinical team to determine whether the patient 
is a true believer, or in need of psychological as well as spiritual 
counseling before the treatments are refused or withdrawn. 
Focusing on these dimensions allows providers to ask the 
pressing ethical questions that would not be allowed or 
encouraged under a pure constitutional or RFRA analysis.  
Efforts to educate providers should disambiguate the legal from 
the ethical, and emphasize the ethical importance of asking 
questions that are foreign to the law. 
 
